Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies
Volume 15

Article 8

1-1-2006

Prior Inconsistent Statements and the Principled Approach: Can
the Supreme Court of Canada Have U.(F.J.) Cake and Eat It Too?
Lana Walker

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.schulichlaw.dal.ca/djls

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative
Works 3.0 License.
Recommended Citation
Lana Walker, "Prior Inconsistent Statements and the Principled Approach: Can the Supreme Court of
Canada Have U.(F.J.) Cake and Eat It Too?" (2006) 15 Dal J Leg Stud 241.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Schulich Law Scholars. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies by an authorized editor of Schulich Law Scholars. For
more information, please contact hannah.steeves@dal.ca.

PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS . . . 241

NOTES

PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS
AND THE PRINCIPLED APPROACH:
CAN THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
HAVE U.(F.J.) CAKE AND EAT IT TOO?
LANA WALKER†

ABSTRACT
The principled approach to the admission of hearsay took a surprising
turn in 2000 when the Supreme Court of Canada handed down R. v.
Starr. The Starr decision severely restricted the type of evidence that
could   be   examined   at   the   threshold   reliability   stage,   conﬁning   the  
analysis to the circumstances under which the statement was made and
declaring that external evidence could no longer be considered in the
analysis. Despite Starr’s holding, courts have continued to consider
external evidence when assessing threshold reliability. The Supreme
Court’s decision in U.(F.J.) may be responsible for this inconsistency.
Although prior inconsistent statement hearsay was at issue in U.(F.J.),
courts dealing with both prior inconsistent statement and declarantunavailable hearsay have cited U.(F.J.)’s principles, which has led to
great analytical confusion. However, R. v. Khelawon represents a step
toward analytical consistency, as the Ontario Court of Appeal sheds
some light on the issue and purports to make some sense out of the
analytical confusion at the threshold reliability stage.
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INTRODUCTION
The “hearsay revolution,” sparked by the court’s adoption of the principled approach, has made great strides to ensure consistency in the admission of hearsay evidence, but has also created additional complexity.
Although R. v. Starr1 represents the Supreme Court of Canada’s latest
word on the application of the principled approach to declarant-unavailable hearsay,2 courts have continued to deviate from its framework due
to confusion and disagreement on how to adapt the older jurisprudence
to the new approach. Indeed, this is evident with the struggle to adapt
R. v. U.(F.J.) 3 into the principled analysis, particularly in light of Starr.
It has been theorized that U.(F.J.) represents an exception to the ban
on extrinsic evidence in the threshold reliability analysis.4 This article
will demonstrate that this theory is incorrect. Rather, as held by Justice Rosenberg in R. v. Khelawon, 5 U.(F.J.) falls within the declarantavailable hearsay category, and is not an exception to the rules guiding
the declarant-unavailable jurisprudence. However, rather than chalking
U.(F.J.)  up  as  an  anomaly  or  conﬁning  it  to  the  declarant-available  category, courts have hinged on the “exception” that it created, stretching
it beyond its limits into declarant-unavailable territory, and impeding
logical jurisprudential development within the principled approach.
This article will illustrate that the confusion and inconsistency within the principled approach stems from a failure to acknowledge that two
analytical models exist at the threshold reliability stage: one for declarant-unavailable hearsay dictated by the R. v. Khan,6 R. v. Smith,7 and
Starr authorities, and the other for declarant-available hearsay emerging
1

[2000] 2 S.C.R. 144, 190 D.L.R. (4th) 591 [Starr].
2
For referential consistency throughout the argument, “declarant-unavailable hearsay” will refer to situations in which the declarant is absent from court, while “declarant-available hearsay” will be analogous to “prior inconsistent statements”, and is
contingent upon an in-court declarant.
3
[1995] 3 S.C.R. 764, S.C.J. No. 82 [U.(F.J.)].
4
Khelawon, infra note 5 at para. 32, 36-38. See also Hamish Stewart, “A Rationale
for the Rejection of Extrinsic Evidence in Assessing the Reliability of Hearsay”
(2005) 30 C.R. (6th) 306 at 313 [Stewart].
5
[2005] O.J. No.723, 195 O.A.C. 11, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, [2005]
S.C.C.A. No. 153 [Khelawon].
6
[1990] 2 S.C.R. 531, S.C.J. No. 81 [Khan].
7
[1992] 2 S.C.R. 915, 94 D.L.R. (4th) 590 [Smith].
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from the R. v. B.(K.G.)8 and U.(F.J.) lineage. The overall discussion will
reveal that there are two factors contributing to the analytical confusion
within the principled approach. First, the restriction placed by Iacobucci
J. on threshold reliability has motivated courts to sidestep his analysis
in Starr and drive them to U.(F.J.)’s “exception,” which has been used
to consider evidence beyond the circumstances in which a statement
was made in assessing threshold reliability for declarant-unavailable
hearsay.9 Second, the courts’ failure to recognize that U.(F.J.) is not an
exception to Starr, but rather a peculiar piece within the prior inconsistent statement puzzle only affecting declarant-available hearsay, has led
to an irrational blending between the declarant-available and declarantunavailable analyses.
This analytical slue has created uncertain legal results, which
threatens the fair treatment of victims, witnesses, and the accused. As
Justice Rosenberg emphasized in Khelawon, the hearsay rule is multipurposed, serving “both evidentiary and procedural goals” by “ensur[ing]
that only trustworthy evidence is admitted” and recognizing that the accused’s interest to due process and a fair trial must be protected.10
This  paper  is  divided  into  four  parts.  Part  I  will  brieﬂy  outline  recent developments guiding the principled approach. Part II will highlight prior inconsistent statements’ debut within the principled approach
through B.(K.G.) and U.(F.J.). In Part III, several lower court decisions
will be summarized to demonstrate that while some courts have recognized the divide between the declarant-available and declarant-unavailable hearsay categories, others have obscured the boundary. Finally, the
Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision in Khelawon will be examined, as it
highlights the discrepancies between Starr and U.(F.J.), and represents
a step toward analytical consistency.

I. THE DEBUT OF THE PRINCIPLED APPROACH
In the early 1990s, Chief Justice Lamer declared that Khan signalled
a  change  in  evidence  law  and  that  hearsay  not  ﬁtting  within  the  traditional categorical exceptions would now be admissible on a principled
8

[1993] 1 S.C.R. 740, S.C.J. No. 22 [B.(K.G.)].
Khelawon, supra note 5 at para. 32.
10
Khelawon, supra note 5 at para. 107.
9
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basis – “the governing principles being the reliability of the evidence,
and its necessity.”11 Courts and commentators accepted the Khan and
Smith  rulings  as  residual  “catch-alls”  for  hearsay  unﬁt  for  the  traditional  
categories.12 The jurisprudence was leaning towards an open hearsay
analysis that broadened a trial judge’s ability to admit reliable evidence.
However, this trend shifted in 2000, when the Supreme Court of Canada
rendered its ruling in Starr.
1. R v. Starr
Iacobucci J.’s decision in Starr   wrought   signiﬁcant   and   unexpected  
changes to the traditional hearsay exceptions.13 Iacobucci J. sparked
controversy by stating that, when assessing threshold reliability,
[T]he trial judge should not consider the declarant’s general
reputation for truthfulness, nor any prior or subsequent statements,
consistent or not. These factors do not concern the circumstances of
the statement itself. Similarly, I would not consider the presence of
corroborating  or  conﬂicting  evidence.14

Although Iacobucci J.’s analysis did not emerge as a logical progression from the preceding Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence, he
followed both the United States Supreme Court’s approach in Idaho v.
Wright15 and the Ontario Court of Appeal’s approach prior to Starr.16
Despite this, the Court’s ruling in Starr proved both “controversial and
restrictive.”17
11

Smith, note 7 at para. 32.
Lee Stuesser “R. v. Starr and Reform of the Hearsay Exceptions” (2001), 7 Can.
Crim. Law Rev. 55 at 56 [Stuesser].
13
Ibid.
14
Starr, supra note 1 at para. 217 [emphasis added].
15
Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990).
16
R. v. Merz (1999), 46 O.R. (3d) 161, [1999] O.J. No. 4309 at para. 51 (“[e]vidence
from other witnesses which is consistent with the substance of an out-of-court
statement is not a circumstance surrounding the making of that statement and cannot
generally be seen as diminishing the risks associated with the admission of hearsay
evidence”) [Merz]; See especially R. v. Conway (1997), 121 C.C.C. (3d) 397, [1997]
O.J. No. 5224 at para. 43-45.
17
Don Stuart, “Starr and Parrott: Favouring Exclusion of Hearsay to Protect Rights
12
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In narrowing threshold reliability to “whether or not the circumstances surrounding the statement provide circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness,” Iacobucci J. effectively prohibited corroborating evidence from entering the threshold reliability analysis.18 This restriction
proved puzzling. Pre-Starr commentators argued that while threshold
reliability “may have traditionally focused on a narrow inquiry into the
circumstances surrounding the making of the statement, a rigid adherence to this approach [could not] be countenanced in a new era of hearsay cases.”19   Iacobucci   J.’s   conﬁned   approach   also   contrasted   sharply  
with Justice McLachlin’s open analysis in Khan.20 As evidenced in
Khan, corroborating evidence “ha[d] long been an important tool used
by trial judges in determining admissibility,” which made Iacobucci J.’s
holding perplexing.21
Although Iacobucci J. expressly stated that evidence going beyond the circumstances in which a statement was made should not be
considered in assessing threshold reliability, extrinsic evidence has continued to creep into the threshold reliability analysis post-Starr.22 This
tendency typically relies on the prior inconsistent statement authorities
and, in particular, the “U.F.J. exception.”23 As the following analysis
will demonstrate, this reliance is faulty, as courts faced with declarantunavailable hearsay should not be drawing on the declarant-available
authorities.

of Accused” (2001) 39 C.R. (5th) 284 at 286. See also David M. Tanovich, “Starr
Gazing: Looking into the Future of Hearsay in Canada” (2003) 28 Queen’s L.J. 371
at 401-02 [Tanovich].
18
Starr, supra note 1 at para. 215.
19
Laurie Lacelle, “The Role of Corroborating Evidence in Assessing the Reliability
of Hearsay Statements for Substantive Purposes” (1999) 19 C.R. (5th) 376 at 392
[Lacelle].
20
Khan, supra note 6 at para. 30.
21
David M. Paciocco & Lee Stuesser, The Law of Evidence 3rd ed. (Toronto: Irwin
Law, 2002) at 118 [Paciocco].
22
Starr, supra note 1 at para. 217.
23
Khelawon, supra note 5 at paras.32.
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II. PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS
1. “I Said What?”
Prior inconsistent statements are a challenging form of hearsay because,
although the hearsay declarant may be cross-examined, there is often
difﬁculty   manifest   in   deciding   “whether   [or   not]   to   prefer   an   out-of-
court statement to a witness’s own evidence at trial.”24 With the 1993
decision of B.(K.G.), prior inconsistent statements found new life as
evidence that could be used to prove the truth of their contents by applying the principled approach to declarant-available hearsay. In making
the move to regard prior inconsistent statements as potentially acceptable hearsay, Chief Justice Lamer addressed the hearsay dangers in the
declarant-available context.25 In speaking for the Court, he held that:
[E]vidence of prior inconsistent statements of a witness other than
an accused should be substantively admissible on a principled basis,
following this Court’s decisions in Khan and Smith. However, it is
clear  that  the  factors  identiﬁed  in  those  cases  –  reliability  and  necessity  
–  must  be  adapted  and  reﬁned  in  this  particular  context,  given  the  
particular problems raised by the nature of such statements.26

Justice Cory agreed that Khan and Smith do “provide an alternative  justiﬁcation”  for  admitting  prior  inconsistent  statements  for  substantive  purposes,  and  held  that  “their  unmodiﬁed  application  to  prior  
inconsistent statements would [not] adequately protect the interests of
the accused from the potential dangers that surround the introduction of
statements made in court.”27 However, he differed on where he would
place  his  analytical  limitations,  ﬁnding  the  Chief  Justice’s  reliability  indicators too restrictive.28 Justice Cory’s reasoning foreshadows the subsequent case law, as courts are tending to push the analysis towards his
limits.

24
25
26
27
28

Lacelle, supra note 19 at 386.
B.(K.G.), supra note 8 at paras. 86-104.
B.(K.G.), supra note 8 at para. 73.
B.(K.G.), supra note 8 at para. 126.

B.(K.G.), supra note 8 at para. 126.
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Although  the  Chief  Justice  speciﬁed  very  strict  reliability  indicators,  
he also stipulated that substitute “circumstantial guarantees of reliability” could satisfy the reliability requirement, which would be assessed
according to the individual judge’s discretion.29 A mere two years later,
the Supreme Court of Canada revisited this proposition in U.(F.J.), in
which Chief Justice Lamer admitted a prior inconsistent statement in the
absence of the B.(K.G.) requirements.30
The prior inconsistent statements in U.(F.J.) were of questionable
reliability,   as   they   were   not   given   under   oath   or   warning,   and   ofﬁcer  
notes constituted their only record.31 Despite these warnings signs,
Chief Justice Lamer admitted the complainant’s statement for its truth.
In doing so, the Chief Justice expanded the circumstances in which a
prior inconsistent statement could be used for substantive purposes by
indicating that “a threshold of reliability can sometimes be established,
in cases where the witness is available for cross-examination, by a striking similarity between two statements.” 32 Chief Justice Lamer cautioned
that striking similarities would only go to enhancing threshold reliability “when there is a basis for rejecting […] alternative explanations.” 33
Determining this basis requires the trial judge to look beyond “circumstantial guarantees of reliability” and necessarily involves a consideration of external evidence.34
The Chief Justice’s holding was substantial. However, his indication that “striking similarities” between two statements may sufﬁce  threshold  reliability  only  if  at  least  one  statement  is  “clearly  substantively admissible” is curious, because in U.(F.J.) neither statement
was  sufﬁciently  reliable  on  its  own.35 Despite this discrepancy, U.(F.J.)
has been accepted as good law, condoning an approach that “permits
a form of corroborat[ing] evidence to function in the reliability analysis.”36 However, this “loophole” should not be extended to the threshold
29
30

B.(K.G.), supra note 8 at para. 104.
U.(F.J.), supra note 3.

31

U.(F.J.), supra note 3 at paras. 4-5.

32

U.(F.J.), supra note 3 at para. 40 [emphasis added].

33

U.(F.J.), supra note 3 at para. 40.
U.(F.J.), supra note 3 at para. 39.
U.(F.J.), supra note 3 at para. 49.

34
35
36

Lacelle, supra note 19 at 383.
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reliability analysis of declarant-unavailable hearsay, a caveat which has
been overlooked and which will be explored in Part III.
2. Steer Away From Starr
The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision to admit prior inconsistent
statements for the truth of their contents does not mean that the threshold reliability analyses for declarant-available and declarant-unavailable
hearsay must mirror one another. The ability to cross-examine the declarant  and  the  need  to  have  speciﬁc  reliability  indicators  in  the  analysis,  
represent compelling reasons to have different analytical frameworks
for each category. As Justice Blair stated in Khelawon, “different considerations may apply where the accused has had the opportunity to
cross-examine the declarant as in R. v. B.(K.G.), [and] R. v. U.(F.J.).”37
Similarly, in R. v. Auger,38 the Northwest Territories Supreme Court recognized  that  speciﬁc  assurances  have  been  built  into  the  threshold  reliability  analysis  that  are  speciﬁc  to  declarant-available  hearsay,  and  that  
any “exceptions to the various precautions which are to be put in place
to try to assure reliability will be narrow.”39

III. STARR, MEET U.(F.J.)
1. A Murky Affair
After Starr, the law regarding threshold reliability for declarant-unavailable hearsay should have been clear, as Iacobucci J. undoubtedly
indicated that a trial judge may not resort to factors going beyond the
circumstances under which a statement was made.40 However, as discussed, the prevailing view seems to be that some exceptions can thwart
the standard approach to threshold reliability for declarant-unavailable

37
38
39
40

Khelawon, supra note 5 at para. 99.
[2001] N.W.T.J. No. 45, 2001 NWTSC 44.
Ibid. at para. 13.

Starr, supra note 1 at para. 217. See generally Paciocco, supra note 21 at
115.
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hearsay.41 The jurisprudential confusion can be traced in part to the acceptance of prior inconsistent statements as potentially admissible hearsay.
Lee Stuesser questions where U.(F.J.)   ﬁts   into   the   principled  
approach. In “R. v. Starr and Reform of the Hearsay Exceptions,” he
argues that U.(F.J.) stands for another exception, condoning the consideration of corroborative evidence in the form of “strikingly similar
statements”  where  there  are  “insufﬁcient  safeguards  in  place  to  meet  the  
K.G.B. requirements.”42 Stuesser’s argument is correct. U.(F.J.) must be
taken  either  as  an  anomaly,  rendered  to  get  a  particular  result  on  speciﬁc  
facts or, alternatively, as an exception to B.(K.G.) that only applies in
narrow circumstances within the declarant-available hearsay category.
However, the courts have disagreed, resulting analytical discrepancies
at the threshold reliability stage.
2. A (Semi) Clear Dividing Line
Some courts have recognized the boundary between declarant-available
and declarant-unavailable hearsay, and have respected the 2 categories’
analytical limits.
In R. v. Czibulka,43 the trial judge followed Starr in assessing threshold reliability and did not look beyond the surrounding circumstances
in determining reliability. On appeal, Justice Rosenberg correctly characterized the two threshold reliability models for declarant-unavailable
and declarant-available hearsay.44 He held that, “[s]ince the declarant
was not available in this case, threshold reliability turned on the Smith,
Khan, and Starr line of cases,” and admissibility depended on the circumstances under which the evidence was produced.45
Similarly, in the case of R. v. Sarrazin46 confusion was evident
in   the   trial   level   judgment,   which   was   clariﬁed   on   appeal.   In   assessing threshold reliability, Justice Roy purported to rely on “consistencies
41

Merz, supra note 16.

42

Stuesser, supra note 12 at 73; U.(F.J.), supra note 3 at para. 42.
R. v. Czibulka [2004] O.J. No. 3723, 189 C.C.C. (3d) 199 at para. 22.

43
44
45
46

Ibid. at para. 24.
Ibid. at para. 26.
R. v. Sarrazin, [2005] O.J. No. 1404, 75 O.R. (3d) 485 [Sarrazin].
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and similarities between the various statements” made by the deceased
declarant.47 Justice Roy clearly relied on U.(F.J.) in holding that striking similarities between the unavailable declarant’s statements could establish reliability.48 On appeal, Justice Blair held that Justice Roy’s approach was incorrect in these circumstances.49 However, Justice Roy’s
approach would have been incorrect even under the right circumstances,
as he did not properly apply U.(F.J.). He failed to recognize that U.(F.
J.) condones reliance on external evidence to establish “striking similarities” between different declarant’s statements, not between the statements of a single declarant. In any case, Justice Roy should not have
been drawing on U.(F.J.)’s principles, since this case concerned declarant-unavailable hearsay.50
3. A Blurry Boundary
Although this section will illustrates situations where the courts have
demonstrated greater confusion at the threshold reliability stage, the
cases that will be discussed are similar to those in the previous section,
where  differentiation  between  the  analyses  was  vague  or  was  clariﬁed  
on appeal. For instance, R. v. Chrisanthopoulos51 turned on an anonymous 911 caller’s statement, which the Crown sought to introduce for
the truth of its contents.52 The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge
properly admitted the hearsay, considering only “the circumstances surrounding the call” in assessing threshold reliability.53 Although the court
found that the reliability analysis was correctly executed, it agreed with
the Crown that:
[I]n light of the striking similarities between the event described by the
caller and the events which occurred shortly thereafter, this was one of
those  rare  instances,  identiﬁed  in  R.  v.  U.(F.J.)[…],  in  which  it  would  
have been permissible for the trial judge to consider the surrounding
47
48
49
50
51
52
53

Ibid. at para. 74.
Ibid.
Ibid.

Ibid.
R. v. Chrisanthopoulos, [2003] O.J. No. 5252, 180 O.A.C. 124.
Ibid. at para. 4.
Ibid. at para. 9.
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evidence as a means of testing the reliability of the 911 call.54

This holding is curious since this case did not involve prior inconsistent statements, and the anonymous declarant was clearly not
available  for  cross-examination.  Further,  it  is  difﬁcult  to  ascertain  why  
the Court of Appeal would compare an unavailable declarant’s statement to events that occurred afterwards, since U.(F.J.)  speciﬁed  that  the  
correct analysis concerns striking similarities between different people’s
statements. The Court of Appeal’s erroneous comparison between statement and events indicates a misunderstanding of the particular circumstances that are required for U.(F.J.) to operate, and, like in Sarrazin, an
inability to properly apply U.(F.J.)’s principles.
The pre-Starr case of R. v. Dubois55 involved yet another incorrect analysis resulting from the fuzzy divide between declarant-available and unavailable hearsay. The hearsay declarants were young boys
who had been sexually assaulted and were not able to testify at trial.
This was therefore a declarant-unavailable situation, indicating that
Khan and Smith should apply. However, the trial judge decided that
the statements passed the threshold reliability stage, relying partially on
similarities between the children’s statements.56 On appeal, Justice Brossard cited Chief Justice Lamer in U.(F.J.), arguing that “the Supreme
Court decided…that striking similarities between the versions of several persons could contribute to reaching the [reliability] threshold.”57
Like Justice Roy in Sarrazin, Justice Brossard did not execute the U.(F.
J.) analysis correctly. Although this case pre-dates Starr, Justice Brossard should not have been applying U.(F.J.) in any event, as the facts did
not involve prior inconsistent statements.
Analytical confusion is also evident in R. v. Anderson.58 The declarant was too ill to testify and therefore unavailable at trial.59 Justice
Grannary slotted the statements into the prior inconsistent statement category, possibly because the declarant was still alive. Starr seemed to escape Grannary J’s radar. He unnecessarily acknowledged that the state54
55
56
57
58
59

Ibid.
R. v. Dubois, [1997] A.Q. no. 2667, 118 C.C.C. (3d) 544.
Ibid. at 552.
Ibid. at 557.
R. v. Anderson, [2004] B.C.J. No. 1729, BCPC 293.

Ibid. at para. 7-8.
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ments  “were  not  sworn  or  afﬁrmed  and  were  not  videotaped.”60 Further,
in conducting the reliability analysis, he went beyond the boundaries set
out in Starr  and  considered  “items  of  reliability,”  such  as  the  “conﬁrmation of [the complainant’s] statements by extraneous objective evidence.61
This overview indicates that the line between declarant-available hearsay and declarant-unavailable hearsay is murky, and is leading to faulty analyses. Courts must begin to acknowledge that the two
hearsay categories have different histories and authorities, and are augmented by concerns that are unique to either refuting a present witness’s
testimony or admitting evidence in the absence of cross-examination.
For these reasons, threshold reliability must remain distinct for declarant-unavailable and declarant-available hearsay.
4. Khelawon Clears It Up?
In 2005, the Ontario Court of Appeal handed down Khelawon, contemplating the differences between the U.(F.J.) and Starr holdings and
purporting  to  glean  some  sense  of  clarity  from  their  conﬂicting  principles.62
Videotaped statements concerning allegations against Khelawon
were taken from two declarants, who were deceased by the time of trial,
thus bringing declarant-unavailable hearsay into issue. In admitting the
statements, Mr. Justice Grossi averted Starr’s analytical boundaries and
incorrectly considered external evidence such as corroborating injuries
and the “absence of an alternative suspect.”63 However, the Court of
Appeal excluded the statements, and in doing so, engaged in a useful
discussion.
Justice Blair, dissenting in part, discusses a minority of exceptions to the “no corroborative evidence” rule in Starr, and cited the
“U.F.J. exception” as particularly important to this case.64 He argues that
“although Lamer C.J.C. created the U.(F.J.) exception in the context of
60
61

Ibid. at para. 26.
Ibid. at para. 39.

62

Khelawon, supra note 5.

63

Khelawon, supra note 5 at para. 33.
Khelawon, supra note 5 at paras. 24-25.

64
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the admissibility of a prior inconsistent statement where the witness was
available for cross-examination”, he does not “see a principled impediment to extending that exception” to declarant-unavailable situations.65
Justice Blair recognizes that there are sound reasons for distinguishing
“between situations where the declarant is available for cross-examination and those where the declarant is not available in considering the admissibility of hearsay.”66 Although he accurately separates the hearsay
authorities, in doing so, he makes some questionable statements.
In justifying U.(F.J.)’s survival after Starr, he argues that “[t]he Supreme Court did not state that it was overruling itself in U.(F.J.), a clearly articulated and well-recognized prior authority.”67  As  further  justiﬁcation, Justice Blair points out that Iacobucci J.’s reference to U.(F.J.) in
Starr indicates that U.(F.J.) was not overruled by Starr.68 One wonders
why the same argument cannot be made for Khan, as Iacobucci J. also
cited Khan.69 While he did not state that he was overruling Khan, corroborative evidence can no longer be considered in the threshold reliability analysis, and therefore by implication, Starr has overruled Khan.70
In considering this, Justice Blair states that while “it is not necessary
as a matter of law, had the court intended to overrule itself on such a
well-deﬁned  point  as  that  made  in  U.(F.J.), [he] would have expected it
to have said so, and to have conducted at least a minimal analysis of the
guidelines.”71 Once again, Iacobucci J.’s treatment of Khan in Starr suggests that Justice Blair’s reasoning for why U.(F.J.) was not overruled
by Starr   may   be   ﬂawed,   as   Khan was taken as being overruled with
absolutely no corresponding analysis.72
While attempting to reconcile U.(F.J.) and Starr by demonstrating how and when U.(F.J.) applies to declarant-unavailable hearsay,
Justice Blair misses the point: U.(F.J.)’s analysis is not relevant to the
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72

Khelawon, supra note 5 at para. 46.
Khelawon, supra note 5 at para. 45.
Khelawon, supra note 5 at para. 39.
Khelawon, supra note 5 at para. 39.

Starr, supra note 1 at paras. 106, 153-55, 190.
Starr, supra note 1 at para. 217.
Khelawon, supra note 5 at para. 40.

Starr, supra note 1 at para. 217. See Suhail Akhtar, “Hearsay: The Denial of
Conﬁrmation”  (2005)  26  C.R.  (6th)  46  at  52.  See  also  Tanovich,  supra note 17 at
402.
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declarant-unavailable context. Therefore, any discussion concerning
why U.(F.J.) has survived Starr is moot, since Starr only affects authorities within the declarant-unavailable lineage. It is therefore impossible
for Starr to have overruled U.(F.J.).
   Justice   Rosenberg   delivers   reasons   reﬂecting   the   correct   position. He points to the declarant’s availability in U.(F.J.) as the crucial
deﬁning  feature  between  U.(F.J.) and Starr, which permits “a full and
meaningful cross-examination.”73 He emphasizes that “[w]here the declarant is available the emphasis is not so much on the inherent reliability of the statement itself but the safeguards in place to detect unreliability.”74 Further, because the declarant’s availability “provides a powerful
safeguard for discovering whether the prior out of court statement is
true,” when a declarant is absent, it makes sense that Starr would hold
“that the safeguards must be found in the circumstances surrounding the
taking of the statement.”75
Justice Rosenberg’s reasons indicate that threshold reliability is
to be approached differently for declarant-unavailable and declarantavailable hearsay. In holding that U.(F.J.) does allow a court to move
away from “the strictures of Starr where the declarant is available”, he
indicates that U.(F.J.)’s “exception” is not universal and only applies to
declarant-available hearsay.76

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
If consistency is to be achieved, a few simple rules must be followed. As discussed, several cases since Starr have cited U.(F.J.) as
authority for averting Starr’s strict threshold reliability analysis. It is
therefore necessary to draw some boundaries around U.(F.J.)’s applicability to guide courts in the future.
First, U.(F.J.) applies to declarant-available hearsay, which necessarily involves prior inconsistent statements and a declarant with a
present memory. Courts are cautioned that a declarant’s presence does
not automatically trigger the declarant-available authorities. A true declarant-available situation will only exist when the declarant remem73

Khelawon, supra note 5 at para. 111.
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bers making the prior statement, so that meaningful cross-examination
may be conducted. A present declarant who is claiming no memory will
therefore necessitate the invocation of the declarant-unavailable authorities of Khan, Smith, and Starr.
Second, U.(F.J.) applies to very few situations within the declarant-available  category.  Speciﬁcally,  U.(F.J.) condones resort to external
evidence  within  strictly  conﬁned  parameters  and  for  one  purpose  only:  
to determine whether or not “striking similarities” exist between statements. In assessing “striking similarities,” the court should focus on
evidence that goes to whether or not declarants have colluded, gained
access to each other’s statement records, or rendered statements under
the  inﬂuence  of  interrogators  or  third  parties.77
Third, the comparator statement invoked for determining the
“striking similarity” must already be “substantively reliable” on its
own.78 Presumably, this reliability would have to be based on the B.(K.
G.) indicators or the comparator declarant’s presence in court coupled
with his adopting the prior statement. When resort to external evidence
for threshold reliability is limited by these three conditions, U.(F.J.)’s
effect   will   be   conﬁned   to   cases   within   the   declarant-available   family,  
and then, will seldom apply. After all, Chief Justice Lamer himself anticipated that “statements so strikingly similar as to bolster their reliability will be rare,” and therefore the “U.F.J. exception” will be exceptional.79

CONCLUSION
Although Starr represents the Supreme Court of Canada’s latest word
on declarant-unavailable hearsay, the subsequent jurisprudence indicates otherwise. As courts and commentators have made clear, there are
“valid reasons” for sustaining a distinction between declarant-available
and declarant-unavailable threshold reliability analyses.80 However, this
distinction has faltered, presumably because courts dealing with declar-
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ant-unavailable hearsay cases are using U.(F.J.) to avoid Starr’s threshold reliability analysis.
Although the recent limits that Starr placed on threshold reliability have been highly criticized, this is where the jurisprudence
stands right now, and Starr’s threshold reliability restrictions should be
respected. As Stuesser argues, Starr is the current “statement of the law
that is to guide us in our future re-examination of other hearsay exceptions.”81 Therefore, it should be followed until the Supreme Court of
Canada decides that the analysis needs to be changed and gives formal
word on the issue. Further, since U.(F.J.) seems to have been rendered
so  as  to  obtain  a  precise  result  on  speciﬁc  facts,  and  not  to  create  a  more  
ﬂexible  analysis,  its  framework  should  be  resorted  to  with  caution.  
The threshold reliability analyses for declarant-unavailable and
declarant-available authorities must remain distinct if fair and consistent legal results are to be achieved. Courts should not dabble in both
worlds by taking what they like from the declarant-unavailable and declarant-available categories and then applying custom-made analyses to
their particular facts. When applying the principled approach to hearsay
evidence, the courts must not have their cake and eat it too.
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